South Carolina Law Review
Volume 49

Issue 1

Article 5

Fall 1997

No Pay, No Play: Trial Broadcast Fees Are Constitutional
Stephen D. Easton

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Easton, Stephen D. (1997) "No Pay, No Play: Trial Broadcast Fees Are Constitutional," South Carolina Law
Review: Vol. 49 : Iss. 1 , Article 5.
Available at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol49/iss1/5

This Article is brought to you by the Law Reviews and Journals at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in South Carolina Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholar Commons. For more information, please
contact digres@mailbox.sc.edu.

Easton: No Pay, No Play: Trial Broadcast Fees Are Constitutional

No PAY, No PLAY: TRIAL BROADCAST
FEES ARE CONSTITUTIONAL
STEPHEN D. EASTON
I.
H.

INTRODUCTION .........................................
THE BROADCAST-FEES-FOR-VICTIMS PROPOSAL
DOES NOT IMPOSE AN IMPROPER TAX ON THE MEDIA ...........
III. THE BROADCAST-FEES-FOR-VICTIMS PROPOSAL DOES NOT

73
74

ESTABLISH A MEANS FOR GOvERNMENT CENSORSHIP ........... 76
IV. THE BROADCAST-FEES-FOR-VICTIMS PROPOSAL DOES NOT
UNCONSTITUTIONALLY DISCRIMINATE .......................
V. THE BROADCAST-FEES-FOR-VICTIMS PROPOSAL IS
A CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT SALE ......................
VI. CONCLUSION .................................

I.

78
80
81

INTRODUCTION

Two obstacles loom in the way of responding to the Honorable William
L. Howard.I The first of these barriers is one shared with all law review
authors who respond to critiques of their proposals. As Cecil Rhodes said just
before dying, "so much to do" 2 and in this case, so little time (and space)!
The second difficulty is relatively unusual. As any attorney knows,
arguing with a judge is not wise.3 Moreover, in this instance, the opposition
is not any ordinary judge, but the imposing figure of The Honorable William
L. Howard. Judge Howard has received national attention and respect for his

1. This reply responds to The Honorable William L. Howard, Televised Trials: Can the
Government MarketElectronicAccess?, 49 S.C. L. REv. 55 (1997), which is an analysis of the
constitutional implications of my proposal to charge broadcast fees to those who wish to televise
criminal trials and then to forward those fees to crime victims, as detailed in Stephen D. Easton,
Whose Life Is It, Anyway?: A Proposalfor RedistributingSome of the Economic Benefits of
Cameras in the Courtroomfrom Broadcastersto Crime Victims, 49 S.C. L. REv. 1 (1997).
2. JOHN BARTLETT, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 564 (Justin Kaplan ed., 16th ed. 1992). The
entirety of Rhodes last words, which perhaps is more applicable to this effort, was "So little
done-so much to do." Id.
3. I am aware of the attorneys' axiom of avoidance of disputes with judges. Stephen D.
Easton, A Guide to the Careand Feedingof Judges, THE PROSECUTOR, July/Aug. 1997, at 36,
37 ("Rule VII: Pick Your Battles (Especially Your Battles with the Judge) Carefully.").
Nonetheless, given Judge Howard's incorrect (in my view) argument that the broadcast-fees-forvictims proposal violates the Constitution, I am left with no choice other than outlining my
disagreement. Id. at 37-38 ("Unfortunately, you cannot always get the judge to agree with you,
and you sometimes have to disagree with the judge ....
).
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knowledge of the issues surrounding cameras in the courtroom, based upon his
experience in the Susan Smith case. He is also held in high regard in his home
state of South Carolina, as is evidenced by his recent election to the South
Carolina Court of Appeals.
Undaunted by these challenges, this brief reply will outline why the
proposal of broadcast fees for victims is allowed under the Constitution. This

reply will respond to the issues raised by Judge Howard's article in roughly
the same order he raised them. First, Part II will confirm that the broadcastfees-for-victims proposal is not an improper selective economic burden or tax
on the media. Next, Part III will contend that the proposal does not establish
a means for government censorship of the media. Then, Part IV will assert
that it does not improperly place an economic burden on one segment of the
press or otherwise discriminate against the press. Finally, Part V will reiterate
the propriety of government sale of broadcast, and many other, rights.
I.

THE BROADCAST-FEES-FOR-VICTIMS PROPOSAL DOES NOT IMPOSE AN
IMPROPER TAX ON THE MEDIA

Judge Howard first suggests that the broadcast-fees-for-victims proposal
constitutes "a financial burden singularly applicable to the press" 4 that is
disallowed under the United States Supreme Court's media taxation cases. This
suggestion results from an overly expansive reading and application of this
case law.
The case primarily relied upon by Judge Howard, Minneapolis Star &
Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Commissioner of Revenue,5 is readily distinguishable. In Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co., the State of Minnesota enacted a use
tax on the paper and ink used by publishers.6 The tax applied only to
publishers who used more than $100,000 of ink and paper in a calendar year. 7
The Supreme Court held that this selective ink and paper use tax was an
unconstitutional "special tax that applies only to certain publications protected
by the First Amendment."8
Unlike the ink and paper tax in Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co., the
broadcast-fees-for-victims proposal involves entirely voluntary payments-not
unavoidable taxes. To produce a large circulation paper in Minnesota, a
publisher had to use more than $100,000 of ink and paper and therefore had
to pay the ink and paper tax. Under the broadcast-fees-for-victims proposal,

4. Howard, supra note 1, at 58.
5. 460 U.S. 575 (1983).
6. Id. at 577.
7. See id. at 578 ("Ink and paper used in publications became the only items subject to the
use tax. .. ").
8. Id.at 581.
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no person or entity will ever have to pay for the right to broadcast trials.
Those who wish to avoid paying broadcast fees will have the full power to do
so. By choosing not to record or broadcast images from inside the courtroom,

any entity will entirely avoid the economic burden of the broadcast-fees-forvictims proposal. 9
Unlike ink and paper for the publishing industry, courtroom cameras are
not a necessity for television producers. Even television networks that
specialize in coverage of trials, including Cable TV and CNN, can cover those
trials without operating cameras inside courtrooms. These networks and other

television producers have extensively covered many trials without courtroom
cameras, including the Mike Tyson rape trial,'0 the Polly Klaas kidnapping
and murder trial," the World Trade Center bombing trial,12 the Timothy
McVeigh Oklahoma City federal
building bombing trial, 3 and Judge
14
trial.
Smith
Susan
Howard's own
While television producers undoubtedly would have preferred to place
cameras inside these courtrooms, the Constitution did not require these trials
to be televised. Because neither the Supreme Court nor the federal courts of
appeals have recognized a First Amendment right to televise trials, 5 the
broadcast-fees-for-victims proposal does not infringe upon any First Amendment right. Newspaper publishers have a well-recognized First Amendment
right to publish, and exercising this right requires use of ink and paper.
Television producers have no First Amendment right to broadcast criminal
trials. Producers can freely exercise the First Amendment rights that they do

9. The commentator that Judge Howard repeatedly cites recognizes that the voluntary nature
of courtroom broadcast fees place them outside the Supreme Court's media tax cases. See David
W. Burcham, High-Profile Trials: Can Government Sell the "Right" to Broadcast the
Proceedings?,3 UCLA ENT. L. REv. 169, 195 (1996), stating:

[N]ot... all members of the targeted group would be burdened by the tax,
but only those desiring to broadcast a court proceeding. Given this...
structure, a court would be unlikely to find that a fees-for-feed policy would
present the 'danger of censorship' inherent in ...

discrimination [that

targets a subset of a larger group].
10. Indiana is one of three states that do not allow cameras in their courtrooms, Easton, supra
note 1, at 14.
11. Hugh Dellios, U.S. Justice System Hit by Simpson Trial Fallout, CHI. TRi., Sept. 18,
1995, at 1.
12. Robert Schmidt, Novel Camera Issue at Play in Bombing Case, RECORDER (SAN
FRANCISCO), June 11, 1996, at 1.

13.1d.
14. Dellios, supra note 11, at 10.
15. See Easton, supra note 1, at 48 & nn.250-51; see also Burcham, supra note 9, at 174
("The media has no constitutional right to record the events by camera or magnetic tape, or to
televise the proceedings.").
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possess, namely the right to attend and cover all public trials,' 6 without ever
paying broadcast fees."
III. THE BROADCAST-FEES-FOR-VICTIMS PROPOSAL DOES NOT ESTABLISH A
MEANS FOR GOVERNMENT CENSORSHIP

Despite Judge Howard's characterization of the argument as a "classic
syllogism,"18 the absence of a First Amendment right to broadcast trials does
indeed establish a constitutionally legitimate basis for charging fees to those
who wish to broadcast trials. Of course, the absence of a constitutional right
to televise trials does not mean that any conceivable rule regulating the

televising of trials would be acceptable, regardless of its provisions. Certainly,
some conceivable rules allowing courtroom cameras would be unconstitutional.
For example, a rule allowing cameras in courtrooms or providing for a
discount on broadcast fees only if television producers agreed to praise the
judge would be constitutionally suspect and presumably prohibited. Either rule
would be a constitutionally impermissible content-based restriction. According
to the Supreme Court, "Regulations which permit the Government to
discriminate on the basis of the content of the message cannot be tolerated'
under the First Amendment. "19
As Judge Howard concedes,' the broadcast-fees-for-victims proposal is
content-neutral.2" Once an entity pays the applicable broadcast fee, use of the
television feeds that it acquires in its programming is unrestricted. 2 Similarly, the entity can choose not to pay the broadcast fee and thereafter exercise
its First Amendment right to cover the trial with whatever content it desires,
including criticism of the court.

16. The First Amendment states that "Congress shall make no laws ... abridging the freedom
of press." U.S. CONST., Amend. 1.
17. See infra notes 30, 32.
18. Howard, supra note 1, at 57 n.18.
19. Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 648-49 (1984).
20. In Judge Howard's words, "Unless the description of television coverage of high-profile
trials as entertainment is viewed as an underlying censorship motivation, the proposal is clearly
content-neutral." Howard, supra note 1, at 68. The broadcast-fees-for-victims proposal is
content-neutral regardless of whether television networks televise trials for entertainment or
educational purposes because the proposal makes no distinction between these two motivations.
Cf. Easton, supra note 1, app. (including no provisions distinguishing between educational and
entertainment programming).
21. Judge Howard is not alone in recognizing that a system for charging broadcast fees is
content-neutral. See Burcham, supra note 9, at 205 ("To be sure, levying a fee for access to the
governmental property necessary to generate electronic feed is a type of 'content neutral'

restriction.").
22. Easton, supra note 1, app. at 52.
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The content-neutral nature of the broadcast-fees-for-victims proposal
renders much of Judge Howard's analysis of the economic impact of the
proposal inapplicable. A review of media tax cases reveals that the concern at
the heart of these cases is the possibility of creating a means for government
censorship of the media.'
The broadcast-fees-for-victims proposal does not create the means for a
court to discriminate based upon content. If the courts discriminate based upon
content, then that discrimination results from courts' authority to prohibit
altogether the televising of trials. If television producers can establish that a
court has decided whether to allow televising of trials, with or without
broadcast fees, on the basis of content, then they might have a legitimate
constitutional complaint. However, the ability of courts to prohibit televising
of trials-not their ability to charge broadcast fees-establishes the means for

potential content-based discrimination.
Until the courts recognize a First Amendment right to televise trials,
content-neutral rules that limit or prohibit televising of trials can survive
rational-basis scrutiny. The absence of a First Amendment right to televise

trials also distinguishes the broadcast-fees-for-victims proposal from the
unconstitutional Son of Sam law reviewed in Simon & Schuster, Inc. v.

23. In reviewing its earlier decision in Grosieanv. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936),
the Court observed in Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Commissionerof Revenue,
460 U.S. 575 (1983):
After noting that the tax was "single in kind" and that keying the tax to circulation
curtailed the flow of information, this Court held the tax invalid as an abridgement
of the freedom of the press. Both the brief and the argument of the publishers in this
Court emphasized the events leading up to the tax and the contemporary political
climate in Louisiana. All but one of the large papers subject to the tax had "ganged
up" on Senator Huey Long, and a circular distributed by Long and the Governor to
each member of the state legislature described "lying newspapers" as conducting "a
vicious campaign" and the tax as "a tax on lying, 2c [sic] a lie."
Id. at 579-80 (citations omitted).
The Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. decision itself is based upon concerns about the
potential use of the tax to censor the media:
When the State singles out the press, though, the political constraints that prevent a
legislature from passing crippling taxes of general applicability are weakened, and the
threat of burdensome taxes becomes acute. That threat can operate as effectively as
a censor to check critical comment by the press, undercutting the basic assumption
of our political system that the press will often serve as an important restraint on
government.

Id. at 585.
A 1987 Supreme Court decision was similarly based upon censorship concerns. See
Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 229 (1987) ("[This case involves a
more disturbing use of selective taxation than Minneapolis Star, because the basis on which
Arkansas differentiates between magazines is particularly repugnant to First Amendment
principles: a magazine's tax status depends entirely on its content.").
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Members of the New York State Crime Victims Board.2 4 The New York Son
of Sam statute was an attempt to capture the proceeds of books written by
those who committed crimes. Under the statute, publishers had to pay all
contractual royalties to the Crime Victims Board, rather than to the author,
whenever books or other materials mentioned crimes committed by the
author.' The Supreme Court held that the First Amendment gave either the
author or the publisher the right to produce such materials and that the Son of
Sam law imposed an impermissible "financial disincentive only on speech of
a particular content."'
If the First Amendment gave broadcasters the right to televise trials, they
could credibly argue that limitations on that right would be unconstitutional.
In the absence of that right, Judge Howard could constitutionally refuse to
allow the televising of the Susan Smith trial, and future judges can condition
their grant of the privilege to televise trials upon content-neutral rules
requiring television producers to pay broadcast fees.
IV. THE BROADCAST-FEES-FOR-VICTIMS PROPOSAL DOES NOT
UNCONSTITUTIONALLY DISCRIMINATE

The broadcast-fees-for-victims proposal also does not run afoul of the
equal protection doctrine because it does not discriminate among or against the
media. Judge Howard erroneously believes that "the Easton proposal does
single out an element of the press for special treatment."27 Although the
proposal requires the payment of broadcast fees as a prerequisite to electronic
media coverage, the term electronic media coverage is defined broadly enough
to include all media, not just television or even broadcasting outlets. The
proposal states, "'Electronic media coverage' means any photographing,
recording, or broadcasting of court proceedings by the media using television,
radio, photographic, or recording equipment."' Therefore, any media agency
that wished to use equipment to record or broadcast courtroom proceedings
would be required to pay broadcast fees.29 Although television producers
almost certainly would be the most likely media personnel willing to pay
broadcast fees, radio stations, newspapers, magazines, and even book writers

24. 502 U.S. 105 (1991).
25. Id.at 108-11.
26. Id.at 116.
27. See Howard, supra note 1, at 69.
28. See Easton, supranote 1, app. at 51.
29. Cf. Burcham, supra note 9, at 177 ("The Court has not extended the First Amendment
right of access to the electronic media. In Estes v. Texas, [381 U.S. 532 (1965),] the Court
expressly rejected [the] claima] that... to deny the right [to broadcast from the courtroom]
discriminated against the electronic media in favor of the print media.").
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would be required to pay the fee before broadcasting, photographing, or
otherwise recording criminal trials.30
The almost certain reality that television networks would be more likely
than other media outlets to pay the fees does not make the proposal discriminatory. The greater willingness of television networks to pay broadcast fees for
many trials results from media outlets' internal calculations of the costs and
benefits of paying the fees. The mere fact that television networks have more
to gain financially than other media outlets does not render the proposal,
which requires payment for the right to this financial gain, discriminatory.
Television networks also cannot credibly argue that they must be allowed
to televise trials free of cost to produce a product equivalent to that of print
reporters. Again, the important and currently undisputed holding of the courts
is that the First Amendment does not guarantee the right to televise trials. 31
If any alleged right to compete on supposedly equal footing required televising
of all public criminal trials,32 then Judge Howard could not have kept
television cameras out of the widely covered Susan Smith trial.
The broadcast-fees-for-victims proposal does not discriminate among
media agencies. The proposal also does not discriminate against the media as
a whole. Under the proposal, "any person or organization engaging in
entertainment production or news gathering or reporting" must pay a fee for
this privilege.33 With this extremely broad definition, any person or entity
that wishes to photograph, broadcast, or record criminal trials would be
required to pay broadcast fees. This requirement would apply not only to
traditional news media organizations such as television networks, radio
stations, newspapers, and magazines, but also to anyone who would engage
in "court feed brokering"-recording trials and reselling the right to use these
images. 34 The broadcast fee requirement would even apply to home video
30. The broadcast-fees-for-victimsproposal does not interfere with any media agency's ability
to cover trials without the use of recording or broadcasting equipment. See Easton, supra note
1, app. at 51 ("This provision does not otherwise limit or restrict the right of the media to attend
and report about court proceedings.") Under the proposal, reporters from newspapers, magazines,
television stations, and radio stations (and even nonreporters) would be free to attend trials with
notebooks in hand and to fully exercise their First Amendment rights to write and speak about
these proceedings. They would be fequired to pay broadcast fees only if they wished to
photograph, record, or broadcast trials. The lack of interference with all reporters' basic right
of access to the courtroom, sans recording or broadcasting equipment, renders the proposal
acceptable under the Equal Protection Clause. See infra note 32.
31. Supra note 15 and accompanying text.
32. See Burcham, supra note 9, at 188 ("[W]ith respect to the electronic media's treatment
vis a vis the print media, no credible claim of discrimination can be sustained. Members of the
electronic media who wish to attend a trial and engage in 'conventional' newsgathering activities
enjoy the same constitutional right of access as other media representatives.").
33. See Easton, supra note 1, app. at 51 (defining the media agencies that would be required
to pay broadcast fees).
34. See id. app. at 52 (allowing any entity that secures the right to exclusive coverage through
Published by Scholar Commons, 1997
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enthusiasts who wanted to record trial events for their own entertainment. By
defining any person or entity who wishes to photograph or record trials as a
media agency required to pay broadcast fees for this privilege, the proposal
eliminates distinctions between traditional media outlets and other entities. 35
With this expansive coverage, the proposal does not discriminate between
traditional media outlets and the general public, much less other potential
media agencies.
Because the proposal discriminates neither against segments of the media
nor against the media as a whole, rational-basis scrutiny is appropriate. Equal
protection concerns do not constitutionally prevent the adoption of the proposal
because the proposal easily satisfies this minimal standard.
V.

THE BROADCAST-FEES-FOR-VICTIMS PROPOSAL IS A CONSTITUTIONAL
GOVERNMENT SALE

As a final objection to the broadcast-fees-for-victims proposal, Judge
Howard suggests that the proposal violates constitutional doctrine regarding
proprietary action by governments and "forum analysis."36 Again, however,
this suggestion stems from a misunderstanding of the proposal.
Judge Howard asserts that the proposal "places the State's compelling
interest of compensating crime victims in direct conflict with its fundamental
responsibility to assure the defendant a fair trial." 37 This assertion seemingly
ignores the inherent reality that any system allowing broadcasts of criminal
trials places the interests of those who wish to broadcast in conflict with the

state's responsibility to ensure a fair trial. The broadcast-fees-for-victims
proposal does not create this conflict. Instead, the proposal merely divides the
interest on the pro-television side of this balance between television producers

and crime victims by transferring a portion of the interest from producers to

victims.
The only way to eliminate the tension between those who wish to televise
and the defendants who seek fair trials is to adopt a system that does not allow

sealed bid auctions "to resell any images produced during its electronic media coverage").
35. In discussing New York's Son of Sam statute, the Supreme Court noted that a proposal
with wide coverage does not include distinctions between traditional media outlets and other
entities:
Any "entity" that enters into such a contract [to produce a crime-based book]
becomes by definition a medium of communication, if it was not one already. In any
event, the characterization of an entity as a member of the "media" is irrelevant for
these purposes. The government's power to impose content-based financial
disincentives on speech surely does not vary with the identity of the speaker.
Simon & Schuster Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 117
(1991).
36. See Howard, supra note 1, at 68-70.
37. Id. at 71.
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televising trials under any circumstances. Simply ignoring the "compelling
interest of compensating crime victims"" does nothing to eliminate this
tension.

Furthermore, a government sale of broadcast privileges is constitutionally
permissible. Judge Howard refers the reader to the analysis in David
Burcham's law review article. However, Professor Burcham himself admits
that current forum analysis would not prohibit collection of fees for broadcast

privileges. 39 While Professor Burcham's argument for judicial adoption of a

new line of reasoning' is academically interesting, his need to argue for new
court reasoning merely underscores that government sale of broadcast
privileges is allowed under current law.
Indeed, considering that a government can charge fees for a wide variety
of rights, including the right to broadcast state-produced football games,4" the
right to use state-owned property incidentally in the course of a cable
television business,42 and even the right of parties to litigate in its courts, 43
the State should also be able to charge for the right to use and profit from
state-sanctioned trials occurring on state property. While courtroom-televising
networks will be no more anxious to pay government assessed fees than their
counterparts in the football broadcasting, cable television, and litigating
industries, these networks have no constitutional basis for claiming an
exemption from fees for the right to broadcast trials.
VI. CONCLUSION

The Constitution does not prohibit the content-neutral, broadcast-fees-forvictims proposal. Additionally, the states have a compelling interest in
compensating crime victims, and current financing of state-adopted programs
for compensation of crime victims is inadequate. Given the compelling interest

38. Id. Judge Howard is not alone in his recognition of the importance of compensating crime
victims. See Simon & Schuster, Inc., 502 U.S. at 118 ("There can be little doubt, on the other
hand, that the State has a compelling interest in ensuring that victims of crime are compensated
by those who harm them.").
39. See Burcham, supra note 9, at 200-01 ("No court has accepted the argument that
courtrooms should be deemed traditional governmental fora for purposes of public and press
access."); id. at 202-03 ("[E]xisting doctrine implicitly treats courtroom electronic access...
as a separate, nonpublic forum. That is, government is free to exclude the public and press from
this forum-consisting either of courtroom space or electronic feed-and reserve this property for
government's own, nonpublic uses.") (footnote omitted).
40. See id. at 213 ("These differences suggest that courts should not slavishly adhere to the
holdings and rationales in the government-as-proprietorcases when adjudicating the constitutional
validity of a fees-for-feed policy.").
41. See Easton, supra note 1, at 42-43 & n.221.
42. See id. at 42 & n.218.
43. See id. at 42 & n.219.
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of the states in compensating crime victims, charging television producers who
seek to benefit from the trials that arise from crimes that harmed undercompensated victims would be a small and fully constitutional step in the right
direction.
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